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THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT DOCTRINE AND
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS*
J. BRAD DONOVAN**
One does not have the right to appeal from an interlocutory
order except in certain circumstances. In this Article, Mr. Donovan
focuses on the right to appeal based on the substantial right doc-
trine. This subject was addressed by Justice Willis P. Whichard in
an article published in 1984, and Mr. Donovan continues the work
in this area with a study of the subsequent case law. The Article
carries forward the format used by Justice Whichard -presenting
the law according to the subject area of the law. The twenty-four
subject areas are organized alphabetically to facilitate the use of
the Article as a reference guide.
I. INTRODUCTION
The judgment of a trial court is either final in its disposition
of all the claims of all the parties to an action, or it is interlocutory
in nature.' An order is interlocutory if it is made during the pen-
dency of an action and it does not dispose of the case but requires
further action by the trial court in order to finally determine the
rights of all the parties involved in the controversy.2 Generally,
there is no right to appeal from an interlocutory order.3
There are, however, a few instances in which an interlocutory
order may warrant immediate appellate review. Under section
1A-1, Rule 54(b), of the General Statutes of North Carolina, where
multiple parties are involved in an action and the trial court
enters final judgment as to fewer than all the parties, the trial
court may certify that there is no just reason for delay, thereby
submitting the interlocutory order for appellate review. Similarly,
where more than one claim for relief is presented in an action and
the court enters a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than
* This paper has been updated to include cases published through 30
August 1994.
** Central Staff, North Carolina Court of Appeals.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 54(a) (1990).
2. Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E.2d 377 (1950).
3. Id.
1
Donovan: The Substantial Right Doctrine and Interlocutory Appeals
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
all of the claims, the judgment may be subject to review upon cer-
tification by the trial court.
However, even if no appeal of an interlocutory order is permit-
ted under Rule 54(b) due to the trial court's failure to provide cer-
tification, an appellant may qualify for immediate appellate
review pursuant to the pertinent provisions of sections 1-277 and
7A-27(d)(1) of the General Statutes of North Carolina.4
Section 7A-27(d) provides as follows:
(d) From any interlocutory order or judgment of a superior court
or district court in a civil action or proceeding which
(1) Affects a substantial right, or
(2) In effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from
which appeal might be taken, or
(3) Discontinues the action, or
(4) Grants or refuses a new trial, appeal lies of right directly to
the Court of Appeals.5
Section 1-277(a) provides as follows:
(a) An appeal may be taken from every judicial order or determi-
nation of a judge of a superior of district court, upon or involving a
matter of law or legal inference, whether made in or out of session,
which affects a substantial right claimed in any action or proceed-
ing; or which in effect determines the action, and prevents a judg-
ment from which an appeal might be taken; or discontinues the
action, or grants or refuses a new trial.6
This paper focuses on the determination of what constitutes a
"substantial right" under the above statutes, thereby warranting
immediate appellate review. Generally, a two part test is applied
to determine whether a substantial right has been affected to an
extent necessary to apply the doctrine. First, the right in question
must qualify as being "substantial."7 This determination alone
has produced a varied and sometimes conflicting accumulation of
precedent. Second, absent immediate appeal, the right so affected
must be "lost, prejudiced or be less than adequately protected by
exception to entry of the interlocutory order."' These require-
ments have evolved through the application of the doctrine, and it
4. Oestreicher v. American Natl Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797
(1976).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(d) (1990).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (1983).
7. See Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1992).
8. J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 6, 362
S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987).
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is apparent through case law study that there remains some disa-
greement as to whether the substantial right in issue must be
"lost," or may be in some lesser way prejudiced or inadequately
protected in order to invoke the doctrine. 9
As Chief Justice Exum stated in an oft quoted text:
Admittedly, the "substantial right" test for appealability of inter-
locutory orders is more easily stated than applied. It is usually
necessary to resolve the question in each case by considering the
particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which
the order from which appeal is sought was entered.' 0
It is the necessity of applying the doctrine on a case by case
basis which provides the framework for this paper. As the volume
of case law consideration of interlocutory appeals has increased,
there have been established a number of rules pertinent to various
areas of the law concerning the issue of substantial rights. This
area of law is constantly being reevaluated as a means to control
the ever expanding number of appeals that enter the system.
Recently, two opinions published by the court of appeals will
undoubtedly, pending review by the supreme court, have a far-
reaching effect on the application of the doctrine.
In Moose v. Nissan of Statesville, Inc.,"1 the court ended
decades of conflicting case law by finally establishing specific crite-
ria for applying the doctrine.12 In so doing, the Moose court over-
ruled a series of cases which had held that the loss of a punitive
damages claim abridged a substantial right.1 3 If this case passes
9. Id.
10. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338,
343 (1978).
11. 115 N.C. App. 423, 444 S.E.2d 694 (1994).
12. The court held that in order to apply the doctrine based on the plaintiff's
substantial right to have all claims against the same defendant(s) heard by the
same jury, the appellant must satisfy a two part test: first, the appellant must
show that "the possibility of undergoing a second trial affects a substantial right
only when the same issues are present in both trials," and (2) that the second
trial would create "the possibility that a party will be prejudiced by different
juries in separate trials rendering inconsistent verdicts on the same factual
issues." Id. at 426, 444 S.E.2d at 697. This holding effectively overrules those
cases relying on Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 225
S.E.2d 797 (1976), which held that a plaintiff need only show that two trials on
the same issues would occur absent an immediate ruling.
13. In Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d
797 (1976), it was held that an order granting the defendant summaryjudgment
as to a claim for punitive damages affected a substantial right of the plaintiff
based on his right to have all issues against the defendant heard by the same
1995]
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supreme court scrutiny, the underlying principles may be applied
to other areas of the law wherein the loss of a substantial right
has been routinely found and the doctrine applied accordingly.
Perhaps a greater change in the practical application of the
doctrine is ultimately possible as a result of the holding in Jeffreys
v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture." It has long been the practice of
the appellate courts to address the interlocutory nature of an
appeal regardless of whether the parties themselves have raised
the issue. Necessarily, it was then determined sua sponte
whether the doctrine should be applied. In Jeffreys, however, the
court of appeals held that it is not the responsibility of the appel-
late courts to supply arguments for appellants, and absent the
presentation of an appropriate argument in support of application
of the doctrine, none will be found.15 It appears, therefore, that
any appeal found so lacking will be dismissed as interlocutory,
without any discussion of applicable case law precedent regarding
substantial rights. This could understandably have a great effect
on those practicing appellate law with little understanding of the
rules surrounding interlocutory appeals. Again, it remains to be
seen whether the supreme court grants discretionary review of
this case.
In 1984, Justice Willis P. Whichard (then a Judge on the
North Carolina Court of Appeals) published an article catego-
rizing the case law according to subject matter and explaining the
current rulings regarding the substantial right doctrine. 16 How-
ever, as demonstrated by the two cases discussed above, since
1984 a great deal of additional rulings have been entered which
have explained, expanded upon, altered or overruled many of the
judge and jury. Id. at 130, 225 S.E.2d at 805. By requiring the additional
showing of the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, the Moose court has
eliminated the substantial rights doctrine from application to such cases, as
separate trials on punitive damage claims do not raise the threat of inconsistent
verdicts. Moose, 115 N.C. App. at 427, 444 S.E.2d at 697. To establish liability
at the initial trial, a plaintiff must show only whether negligence occurred. Id. at
428, 444 S.E.2d at 697. To establish a claim for punitive damages, it must be
shown that the negligence rose to a level of willful or wanton conduct. Id.
Therefore, despite being based upon the same set of facts, the issues presented to
the jury are different. Id.
14. 115 N.C. App. 377, 444 S.E.2d 252 (1994).
15. Id. at 380, 444 S.E.2d at 254 (1994).
16. See Willis P. Whichard, Appealability in North Carolina: Common Law
Definition of the Statutory Substantial Right Doctrine, 47 LAw- & CoNrEMP.
PROBS. 123 (1984).
[Vol. 17:71
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decisions discussed in Justice Whichard's article. For this reason,
this paper attempts to continue the study in this field as it has
progressed since that time. Little is discussed herein regarding
cases prior to 1984 (except as necessary to explain the establish-
ment of a rule or trend, or a change in a line of holdings), as the
above mentioned article has addressed those cases succinctly and
completely. The format established by Justice Whichard, that of
categorizing the case law according to subject area of the law,
lends itself particularly well to the case by case analysis required
here, and has been continued.
The following is primarily intended as a reference guide,
allowing the reader to apply recent rulings or trends to facts
which may appear in cases being considered for appeal. The sub-
ject areas of the law have been presented alphabetically in order
to facilitate its use. There is some overlapping of categories, and
cases which may contain rulings in more than one area of the law
are mentioned in each applicable section. In addition, currently
complete citations have been given each time a case is mentioned,
so that the reader is not required to refer to another portion of the
text in order to obtain this information.
II. SUBJECT AREAS OF THE LAw
A. Amendments to Pleadings
An order allowing a motion to amend a pleading does not
affect a substantial right.'7 This position has been recently reaf-
firmed in Hoots v. Pryor.'8 Similarly, the denial of a motion to
amend pleadings is interlocutory and generally not immediately
appealable.' 9 However, where the denial of a motion to amend
involves a party's request to add a compulsory counterclaim which
would otherwise be lost, a substantial right has been held to be
affected. 20 The theory of protecting claims which, absent an
amendment to the pleadings, would be lost has also been held to
17. See, e.g., Order of Masons v. Order of Masons, 225 N.C. 561, 35 S.E.2d 613
(1945).
18. 106 N.C. App. 397, 417 S.E.2d 269, discretionary review denied, 332 N.C.
345, 421 S.E.2d 148 (1992).
19. Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 189 S.E.2d 484 (1972).
20. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wingler, 110 N.C. App. 397,
429 S.E.2d 759, discretionary review denied, 334 N.C. 434, 433 S.E.2d 177 (1993).
See also Hudspeth v. Bunzey, 35 N.C. App. 231, 241 S.E.2d 119, discretionary
review denied, appeal dismissed, 294 N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978).
1995]
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encompass motions to amend a pleading to include a claim for
equitable distribution.2
In some instances, despite the interlocutory nature of an
appeal and the absence of the involvement of a substantial right,
the court of appeals has held that review of a ruling on a motion to
amend was necessary.22 The issue has arisen where the denial of
the motion to amend was appealed along with other issues in
which a substantial right was affected, and review of the denial of
the motion was necessary in order to address the *issues properly
before the court of appeals.23
B. Arbitration
An order compelling arbitration is interlocutory and does not
affect a substantial right.24 The basis for this holding is found in
section 1-567.18 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, which
provides the instances in which an appeal will lie from an arbitia-
tion ruling. As the court of appeals has held, an order compelling
arbitration is "noticeably absent" from the list.25 Conversely, an
order denying an application to compel arbitration does affect a
substantial right and thus is an appealable interlocutory order.26
21. Goodwin v. Zeydel, 96 N.C. App. 670, 387 S.E.2d 57 (1990).
22. See Hoots v. Pryor, 106 N.C. App. 397, 417 S.E.2d 269, discretionary
review denied, 332 N.C. 345, 421 S.E.2d 148 (1992).
23. In Hoots, the claims against two of the three defendants were dismissed
pursuant to section 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) of the General Statutes of North
Carolina. Hoots, i06 N.C. App. at 399, 417 S.E.2d at 271. The dismissals were
appealed along with the denial of plaintiff's motion to amend. Id. at 400, 417
S.E.2d at 271. The court of appeals held that the order dismissing two of the
defendants, while interlocutory, affected a substantial right of the plaintiff based
on the possibility of later inconsistent verdicts. Id. at 402, 417 S.E.2d at 273. See
infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text. Thereafter, it was determined that
review of the order denying the motion to amend was necessary prior to
addressing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals. Hoots, 106 N.C. App. at 403, 417 S.E.2d
at 273. For this reason, the appeal was treated as a petition for writ of certiorari.
Id.
24. North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 95 N.C. App.
123, 381 S.E.2d 896, discretionary review denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 461
(1989); The Bluffs, Inc. v. Wysocki, 68 N.C. App. 284, 314 S.E.2d 291 (1984).
25. The Bluffs, Inc., 68 N.C. App. at 285, 314 S.E.2d at 293.
26. Sims v. Ritter Constr. Inc., 62 N.C. App. 52, 302 S.E.2d 293 (1983). More
recently, this issue has been addressed in the following cases: Bennish v. N.C.
Dance Theater, Inc., 108 N.C. App. 42, 422 S.E.2d 335 (1992); Prime South
Homes, Inc. v. Byrd, 102 N.C. App. 255, 401 S.E.2d 822 (1991); Blow v.
Shaughnessy, 68 N.C. App. 1, 313 S.E.2d 868, discretionary review denied, 311
N.C. 751, 321 S.E.2d 127 (1984). But see Peloquin Assocs. v. Polcaro, 61 N.C.
[Vol. 17:71
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The reasoning behind this is that the right to settle a dispute by
arbitration is a substantial right which would be lost if the appeal
was delayed until after final judgment.27
C. Attorneys
1. Fees
The interlocutory nature of the denial of a motion for attor-
ney's fees was recently addressed by the court of appeals in Howell
v. Howell.28 In Howell, at the time the request for fees was made
there had been no final determination regarding the appellant's
client's case, therefore the appellant was not yet entitled to fees.29
The court of appeals held that the denial of the motion could be
appealed following final judgment, or the appellant could file a
separate action for fees, thus no substantial right was affected by
the holding of the trial court.30
The court of appeals has also held that an order granting
attorney's fees pursuant to section 1A-, Rule 37(a)(4), of the Gen-
eral Statutes of North Carolina does not finally determine the
action nor does it affect a substantial right which may be lost,
prejudiced or less than adequately protected absent immediate
appellate review.31 However, in K & K Development Corp. v.
Columbia Banking Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,32 the court of
appeals held that an order of summary judgment which also
awards attorney's fees affects a substantial right and is immedi-
ately appealable.
App. 345, 300 S.E.2d 477 (1983) (order of the trial court staying arbitration
pending the determination by the court of an issue of fraud raised in the answer
to the complaint was deemed not to affect a substantial right and was thereby
non-appealable).
27. Sims, 62 N.C. App. at 53, 302 S.E.2d at 294.
28. 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181 (1988).
29. Id. at 117, 365 S.E.2d at 182.
30. Id. The same grounds were used to dismiss the appellant's appeal of the
trial court's denial of his request for a charging lien. Id. at 117, 365 S.E.2d at
183. A charging lien is not available until a final judgment has been entered and
the trial court held that the appellant's request was premature. Id. Again, the
court of appeals found no substantial rights were affected as the appellant could
appeal the denial of the motion or bring a separate action to recover. Id. at 117-
18, 365 S.E.2d at 183.
31. Benfield v. Benfield, 89 N.C. App. 415, 366 S.E.2d 500 (1988).
32. 96 N.C. App. 474, 386 S.E.2d 226 (1989).
1995]
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2. Attorney Disqualification
The court of appeals held in Lowder v. All-Star Mills, Inc.,33
that the denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney affects a sub-
stantial right, rendering the issue immediately appealable.34 In
Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas, Co. ,35 however, the
court of appeals found the denial of a motion to disqualify counsel
did not result in an appealable issue. Distinguishing its facts
from Lowder, the court held that while recognizing that the mov-
ing party had a substantial right to prevent the use of confidential
information from a prior representation against a client in subse-
quent litigation, the deprivation of this right would not injure the
moving party if not corrected before a final judgment was
entered. 6
3. Right to Counsel
In Leonard v. Johns-Manville Corp.37 the court of appeals
held that a party did not have a substantial right to be repre-
sented by counsel who is not licensed to practice in this state. It
was determined that such admission to practice was not a right
but a discretionary privilege. 38 The issue was raised again in
Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 39 where the attorney in ques-
tion had been admitted pro hac vice some time earlier and had
been involved in the lawsuit for several years. The supreme court
held that once an attorney had been admitted to practice pro hac
vice, his client had a substantial right to continuation of that rep-
resentation, "just as with any other attorney duly admitted to
practice law in the State of North Carolina."40 Based on this
statement, it appears that an order dismissing a party's chosen
33. 60 N.C. App. 275, 300 S.E.2d 230, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 309 N.C.
695, 309 S.E.2d 193 (1983).
34. In Lowder, defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiff's attorney was based
on the allegation of a conflict of interest. Id. at 279, 300 S.E.2d at 232-33.
Without discussion, the court of appeals held the denial of the motion affected a
substantial right of defendants. Id. at 278-79, 300 S.E.2d at 232.
35. 102 N.C. App. 659, 403 S.E.2d 593 (1991), affd and remanded, 332 N.C.
288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992),
36. Id. at 662-63, 403 S.E.2d at 595.
37. 57 N.C. App. 553, 291 S.E.2d 828, discretionary review denied, 306 N.C.
558, 294 S.E.2d 371 (1982). In Leonard, the appeal was from an order denying a
motion for admission of counsel pro hac vice. Id. at 553, 291 S.E.2d at 828-29.
38. Id. at 555, 291 S.E.2d at 829.
39. 326 N.C. 723, 392 S.E.2d 735 (1990).
40. Id. at 727, 392 S.E.2d at 737.
[Vol. 17:71
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counsel affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable,
so long as that counsel is licensed to practice in North Carolina.
D. Bonds
An order requiring each party to post a bond in an amount
reasonably approximating the value of assets held by each does
not affect a substantial right, rather it simply preserves the status
quo pending the outcome of litigation.4 1
E. Class Actions
The appealability of an order denying certification of a class
action was first addressed in Perry v. Cullipher.4 2 In examining
the possible outcomes resulting from the denial of certification of a
class, the court of appeals reasoned that if the trial court erred in
denying the certification, the plaintiff could still get a judgment on
his own, without the other members of the class.' The court
noted, however, that in cases where a single member recovers fol-
lowing a denial of class certification, the other members could be
precluded from recovery and so sustain injury which could not be
corrected absent appeal prior to final judgment." On this basis, it
was held that the denial of class certification affects a substantial
right from which immediate appeal lies.46
Where the appealability of an award of certification of a class
was raised, the court of appeals found that no substantial right of
the non-moving party was affected by the ruling.46
F. Condemnation
In City of Winston-Salem v. Ferrell,47 the court of appeals
held that although defendants' damages had yet to be assessed,
the plaintiff city could appeal the determination of liability for
41. Stancil v. Stancil, 94 N.C. App. 760, 381 S.E.2d 720 (1989).
42. 69 N.C. App. 761, 318 S.E.2d 354 (1984).
43. Id. at 762, 318 S.E.2d at 356.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 79 N.C. App. 447, 339
S.E.2d 437 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 319 N.C. 274, 354 S.E.2d 459 (1987);
Dublin v. UCR, Inc., 115 N.C. App. 209, 444 S.E.2d 455 (1994).
46. Faulkenbury v. Teachers' & State Employees' Retirement Sys., 108 N.C.
App. 357,424 S.E.2d 420, aff'd, 335 N.C. 158,436 S.E.2d 821 (1993). Despite the
lack of appealability under the substantial right doctrine, the court of appeals
chose to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari and grant review. Id.
at 375, S.E.2d at 429.
47. 79 N.C. App. 103, 338 S.E.2d 794 (1986).
1995]
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inverse condemnation, as the order affected a substantial right of
the city. 48
G. Contempt
Under section 5A-17 of the General Statutes of North Caro-
lina a person convicted of criminal contempt may appeal in a man-
ner prescribed for criminal appeals.49 Those convicted of civil
contempt may appeal pursuant to those rules governing civil
appeals. 50 As criminal appeals are statutorily limited to final
judgments,5 ' it would appear that there is no appeal from an
interlocutory order finding a party in criminal contempt. Con-
versely, where a party is found in contempt in a civil action for
noncompliance with an order of the trial court, the action is imme-
diately appealable under sections 1-277 and 7A-27 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina as a substantial right has been affected
by the imposition of sanctions.52
In State v. Mauney, 53 an action for child support, the defend-
ant was held in criminal contempt for refusing to submit to a
court-ordered blood test. The court of appeals determined that the
order finding defendant. in contempt was civil in nature, and
therefore appealability rested on an analysis based on the com-
bined statutory requirements of sections 1-277 and 7A-27 as
applied in various civil precedents.5 4 The contempt order was
held to be immediately appealable because "[i]f defendant refuses
to comply, he risks a fine or imprisonment; if he complies, his chal-
lenge to the blood test may become moot."55
48. Id. at 107, 338 S.E.2d at 797. The plaintiff instituted a declaration of
taking against portions of land owned by defendant. Id. at 106, 338 S.E.2d at
797. Defendants counterclaimed for damages incurred by the use of property
inversely condemned by the city and not included in the declaration. Id. The
trial court entered a partial verdict in favor of the defendants' counterclaim,
finding the land in question had been inversely condemned by the plaintiff. Id.
See also North Carolina State Highway Comm'n v. Nuckles, 271 N.C. 1, 13-14,
155 S.E.2d 772, 783 (1967).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-17 (1986).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-24 (1986).
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1444(d) (1988); see infra notes 56-78 and
accompanying text.
52. See Cochran v. Cochran, 93 N.C. App. 574, 378 S.E.2d 580 (1989) (citing
Willis v. Duke Power Co., 291 N.C. 19, 229 S.E.2d 191 (1976)).
53. 106 N.C. App. 26, 415 S.E.2d 208 (1992).
54. Id. at 30, 415 S.E.2d at 210.
55. Id. at 31, 415 S.E.2d at 210. See also Benfield v. Benfield, 89 N.C. App.
415, 366 S.E.2d 500 (1988) (court of appeals finding that an order compelling
[Vol. 17:71
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H. Criminal Cases
Ordinarily, there is no right to appeal in a criminal case
except from a judgment on conviction or upon a plea of guilty.56
The right of appeal in criminal cases is purely statutory.5 7 What
statutes apply, however, has been a source of some confusion.
It has long been held that sections 7A-27 and 1-277 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina provided a right to appeal
from an interlocutory order in a criminal proceeding if the order
deprived the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost
absent immediate review.58 In a line of criminal cases beginning
with State v. Jones,59 the above statutes were relied on to address
the issue of whether an appeal from an order denying a defense
motion to dismiss on grounds that to subject the defendant to a
second trial would violate his constitutional right against double
jeopardy. The court of appeals held that while the above statutes
were applicable, no substantial right was affected because "the
avoidance of a rehearing or trial is not considered to be such a
substantial right."60 Likewise, in State v. Gurganus,6 ' the next
case following Jones to address this issue, the court of appeals
again held there was no right to appeal'from the denial of a
motion to dismiss grounded in a double jeopardy claim.6 2 How-
ever, in State v. Montalbano,63 the court of appeals relied on the
above statutes in assessing the defendant's right to appeal and,
citing Jones, held that the issue of whether a defendant will be
subjected to double jeopardy did affect a substantial right and so
was immediately appealable. 6 ' The discrepancy between these
cases was addressed in State v. Major,65 where it was determined
discovery in which a finding of contempt had been entered affected a substantial
right and so was immediately appealable).
56. State v. Howard, 70 N.C. App. 487, 320 S.E.2d 17 (1984) (citing State v.
Webb, 155 N.C. 426, 70 S.E. 1064 (1911)).
57. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
58. See State v. Childs, 265 N.C. 575, 144 S.E.2d 653 (1965); State v. Bryant,
280 N.C. 407, 185 S.E.2d 854 (1972).
59. 67 N.C. App. 413, 313 S.E.2d 264 (1984).
60. Id. at 416, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
61. 71 N.C. App. 95, 321 S.E.2d 923 (1984).
62. Id. at 100, 321 S.E.2d at 926.
63. 73 N.C. App. 259, 326 S.E.2d 634, discretionary review .denied, appeal
dismissed, 313 N.C. 608, 332 S.E.2d 182 (1985).
64. Id. at 260, 326 S.E.2d at 635.
65. 84 N.C. App. 421, 352 S.E.2d 862, aff'd, 314 N.C. 111, 331 S.E.2d 689
(1987).
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that, pursuant to State v. Bryant,66 the substantial rights criteria
in the above statutes applied, and the issue of double jeopardy did
affect a substantial right of an appellant.67
With the enactment in 1977 of section 15A-1444(d) of the
General Statutes of North Carolina, the applicability in criminal
appeals of the substantial right exception contained in section 1-
277 came into question. Section 15A-1444(d) limited criminal
appeals to the procedures enumerated in section 15A-1441 et seq.,
Chapter 7A of the General Statutes of North Carolina, and the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.68 With few exceptions, these proce-
dures limit appellate review in criminal proceedings to final judg-
ments. 9 There are no provisions for making a determination
regarding whether a substantial right of an appellant would be
affected absent immediate review pursuant to section 1-277. This
issue was examined in State v. Joseph,70 another case wherein
defendant appealed the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
allegations of double jeopardy. The court of appeals determined
that the defendant had no right of appeal under section 15A-
1444(d).7 1 The issue of whether a claim of double jeopardy
affected a substantial right was not addressed, as it was decided
that there was no basis for review pursuant to a substantial right
analysis.7 2 Thus, it would appear that a section 1-277 analysis is
no longer applicable in criminal proceedings and that no right to
appeal an interlocutory order in a criminal appeal exists based on
the abridgment of a substantial right.7 3
The section 1-277 analysis was again applied to an interlocu-
tory appeal in a criminal proceeding in State v. Johnson.74 There
it was determined that the appeal was not interlocutory as a final
judgment had been entered.75 In establishing the statutory basis
for appellate review of a final judgment, however, the court of
appeals relied on section 1-277 as opposed to those procedures
66. 280 N.C. 407, 185 S.E.2d 854 (1972).
67. Major, 84 N.C. App. at 422-23, 352 S.E.2d at 863.
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1444(d) (1988).
69. Id.
70. 92 N.C. App. 203, 374 S.E.2d 132 (1988), cert. denied, 324 N.C. 115, 377
S.E.2d 241 (1989).
71. Id. at 205, 374 S.E.2d at 134.
72. Id. at 206, 374 S.E.2d at 134-35.
73. Id.
74. 95 N.C. App. 757, 383 S.E.2d 692 (1989).
75. Id. at 758, 383 S.E.2d at 693.
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listed in section 15A-1444(d). 76 In addition, the Johnson court ref-
erenced the defendant's substantial right to due process and the
possibility that the defendant could be subjected to double jeop-
ardy.7 Therefore, under the Johnson analysis, a substantial
right issue would result in an immediate appealability pursuant
to section 1-277. However, a statutory analysis clearly supports
the contrary holding found in Joseph.78
I. Default
A judgment by default is the equivalent of a final judgment.79
As such, it is immediately appealable. An order setting aside a
default judgment is interlocutory and is not immediately
appealable.8 0
An Entry of Default, leaving for determination money and
property taken, and damages caused, is interlocutory and not sub-
ject to appellate review.8 '
J. Directed Verdict
In LaFalce v. Wolcott,8 2 the court of appeals held that while
the appeal was interlocutory because final judgment had not been
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. State v. Joseph, 92 N.C. App. 203, 374 S.E.2d 132 (1988), cert. denied, 324
N.C. 115, 377 S.E.2d 241 (1989).
79. See Grant v. Cox, 106 N.C. App. 122, 415 S.E.2d 378 (1992).
80. Home v. Nobility Homes, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 476, 363 S.E.2d 642 (1988).
In Home, the court of appeals determined that the plaintiff's objection to the
order setting aside the default judgment was protected by its exception to the
order. Id. at 478, 363 S.E.2d at 643. Requiring the plaintiff to proceed with trial
did not affect a substantial right warranting immediate appeal. Id. In Kimzay
Winston-Salem, Inc., v. Jester, 103 N.C. App. 77, 404 S.E.2d 176, discretionary
review denied, 329 N.C. 497, 407 S.E.2d 534 (1991), the plaintiff moved under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 60(b)(1) for the setting aside of a default judgment
entered in its favor because the judgment awarded inadvertently omitted
damages to which plaintiff alleged it was entitled to. Id. at 78,404 S.E.2d at 177.
The trial court allowed the motion, reopening the case for hearings to
redetermine damages. Id. at 79, 404 S.E.2d at 177. Although the court of
appeals deemed the appeal to be interlocutory without any substantial right of
defendant affected by the underlying order, review by certiorari was granted. Id.
81. Duncan v. Duncan, 102 N.C. App. 107, 401 S.E.2d 398 (1991).
82. 76 N.C. App. 565, 334 S.E.2d 236 (1985). The trial court entered a
directed verdict against the plaintiffs' claims, denied plaintiffs' motion for a new
trial, and granted defendant's motion for a new trial on his counterclaim. Id. at
567, 334 S.E.2d at 237. Plaintiffs had already completed one trial on their
claims. Id. at 569, 334 S.E.2d at 239. The court of appeals recognized that the
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entered in all the claims, requiring the plaintiffs to undergo two
full trials on the merits affected a substantial right.8 3
In T. H. Blake Contracting Co. v. Sorrells, 4 the trial court
granted directed verdicts in favor of the two defendants.8 5 The
parties then agreed to settle the case, including defendants' coun-
terclaims which remained to be heard. 6 Prior to entry of final
judgment in the case, however, plaintiff withdrew from the settle-
ment agreement and filed notice of appeal from the directed ver-
dicts.8 7  The court of appeals held that the appeal was
interlocutory as the counterclaims remained, and no substantial
right of plaintiff's would be lost absent immediate appeal.88 In
dismissing the appeal, the court of appeals noted that plaintiff
"precipitated the events and circumstances which prevented entry
of final judgment as to all claims in this action."8 9
K Discovery
In general, orders either denying or compelling discovery are
not immediately appealable absent a showing that a substantial
right would be lost if the ruling was not reviewed prior to final
judgment.90 The most common instance in which a substantial
right has been deemed so affected occurs upon a showing that the
discovery sought (1) would not delay the trial or cause the oppos-
ing party unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or
undue burden or expense; and (2) if the information sought is
highly relevant to the critical question at issue in the action.9 '
refusal to address the order on immediate appeal would necessitate a second trial
on the counterclaim, and if plaintiffs' exceptions were meritorious, a third trial
would be necessary to determine plaintiffs' damages. Id. at 569-70, 334 S.E.2d at
239.
83. Id. at 570, 334 S.E.2d at 239.
84. 109 N.C. App. 119, 426 S.E.2d 85 (1993).
85. Id. at 121, 426 S.E.2d at 87.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 122, 426 S.E.2d at 87.
89. Id. at 122, 426 S.E.2d at 87-88.
90. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wingler, 110 N.C. App. 397,
429 S.E.2d 759, discretionary review denied, 334 N.C. 434, 433 S.E.2d 177 (1993).
91. Id. (citing Dworsky v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 49 N.C. App. 446, 271
S.E.2d 522 (1980) for the discussion of the two-part test).
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1. Orders Denying Motions to Compel Discovery
In Brown v. Brown,92 the plaintiff sought equitable distribu-
tion pursuant to the divorce from her husband. Plaintiff success-
fully added her brother-in-law and his ex-wife as defendants, and
claimed that certain real property, purchased by her husband and
thereby subject to equitable distribution, had been deeded in the
names of the other defendants in order to shield it from division.93
Maintaining that these acts subjected the other defendants to
equitable distribution, plaintiff filed a motion for production of
documents.94 The trial court found that property owned by the
other defendants was not marital property and was not subject to
equitable distribution and entered an order limiting the scope of
discovery. 95 The court of appeals held that the trial court's ruling
on the motion to produce documents did not affect a substantial
right. 96 Similarly, in Hale v. Leisure,97 the court of appeals
refused to grant certiorari to review several issues pertaining to
discovery, citing a lack of substantial right infringement and the
need to discourage fragmentary appeals.98
In North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Wingler,99 the defendants filed interrogatories and a request for
production of documents seeking the names of all persons having
any knowledge of the allegations contained in the complaint.10 0
The defendants later requested additional documentation in pos-
session of the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff's agents relating to
the allegations. 10 1 The plaintiff objected to most of the informa-
tion sought on grounds that it had been prepared in anticipation
of litigation.102 The trial court ordered production of most of the
information, with the exception of specific reports designated as
work product.' 0 3 The court of appeals held that while the Win-
92. 77 N.C. App. 206, 334 S.E.2d 506 (1985), discretionary review denied, 315
N.C. 389, 338 S.E.2d 878 (1986).
93. Id. at 206, 334 S.E.2d at 507.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 207, 334 S.E.2d at 507.
96. Id. at 208, 334 S.E.2d at 508.
97. 100 N.C. App. 163, 394 S.E.2d 665 (1990).
98. Id. at 167, 394 S.E.2d at 667-68.
99. 110 N.C. App. 397, 429 S.E.2d 759, discretionary review denied, 334 N.C.
434, 433 S.E.2d 177 (1993).
100. Id. at 400, 429 S.E.2d at 761.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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glers had met the first part of the Dworsky 0 4 test in that the dis-
covery would not have caused any delay, undue burden,
annoyance or oppression to the Farm Bureau, they had failed to
show that the documents were so important to the outcome of the
matter as to amount to a substantial right.10 5 On that basis, the
assignment of error was dismissed.'1 6
2. Orders Compelling Discovery
In Shaw v. Williamson, 7 the court of appeals held that an
order requiring the defendant to answer certain interrogatories
affected a substantial right of the defendant's in light of his con-
tention that to do so would cause him to violate his constitutional
right against self-incrimination.108
In Walker v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,' 0 9 the court of
appeals held that an order compelling discovery was not a final
judgment, and therefore was interlocutory and did not affect a
substantial right. 110 However, citing Midgett v. Crystal Dawn
Corp., 11' the court of appeals recognized that when the order was
enforced by means of sanctions pursuant to section 1A-1, Rule
37(b), of the General Statutes of North Carolina, a right of review
arose.
1 12
In Benfield v. Benfield, '13 defendant's first appeal from an
order compelling discovery was held not to affect a substantial
right because defendant was ordered only to answer certain ques-
tions by a certain date. 1 14 No other sanctions were imposed. 115 In
defendant's second appeal, however, he had been found in con-
tempt by the trial court for failure to comply with the order com-
pelling discovery. 116 The court of appeals found that an order
104. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 401, 429 S.E.2d at 762.
106. Id. at 401-02, 429 S.E.2d at 762.
107. 75 N.C. App. 604, 331 S.E.2d 203, discretionary review denied, 314 N.C.
669, 335 S.E.2d 496 (1985).
108. Id. at 606-07, 331 S.E.2d at 204.
109. 84 N.C. App. 552, 353 S.E.2d 425 (1987).
110. Id. at 554, 353 S.E.2d at 426. See also Dunlap v. Dunlap, 81 N.C. App.
675, 344 S.E.2d 806, discretionary review denied, 318 N.C. 505, 349 S.E.2d 859
(1986).
111. 58 N.C. App. 734, 294 S.E.2d 386 (1982).
112. Walker, 84 N.C. App. at 554-55, 353 S.E.2d at 426.
113. 89 N.C. App. 415, 366 S.E.2d 500 (1988).
114. Id. at 419, 366 S.E.2d at 502-03.
115. Id. at 419, 366 S.E.2d at 502.
116. Id. at 417-18, 366 S.E.2d at 502.
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compelling discovery in which a finding of contempt had been
entered affected a substantial right and so was immediately
appealable.1 17 Appeals so accepted will test the validity of both
the original discovery order and the contempt order.118 The issue
of sanctions used to enforce an order compelling discovery was
again raised in Mack v. Moore,1 9 and Cochran v. Cochran,120 . In
both cases the orders appealed from were found to contain no
enforcement sanctions and so were deemed non-appealable.' 2 1
However, in both cases the court of appeals determined to treat
the appeals as petitions for writ of certiorari and addressed the
merits of each. 122
L. Dismissal Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12
1. Denial of a Motion to Dismiss
Generally, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not immedi-
ately appealable. 123 However, the denial of a Rule 12(b) motion to
117. Id. at 420, 366 S.E.2d at 503.
118. Id.
119. 91 N.C. App. 478, 372 S.E.2d 314 (1988), discretionary review denied, 323
N.C. 704, 377 S.E.2d 225 (1989).
120. 93 N.C. App. 574, 378 S.E.2d 580 (1989).
121. Mack, 91 N.C. App. at 480, 372 S.E.2d at 316; Cochran, 93 N.C. App. at
577, 378 S.E.2d at 582.
122. Mack, 91 N.C. App. at 480, 372 S.E.2d at 316; Cochran, 93 N.C. App. at
577, 378 S.E.2d at 582.
123. See e.g., Travco Hotels v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 102 N.C. App. 659,
403 S.E.2d 593 (1991), aff'd and remanded, 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992)
(order denying defendant's motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages does
not affect a substantial right); CFA Medical, Inc., v. Burkhalter, 95 N.C. App.
391, 383 S.E.2d 214 (1989) (denial of motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
process); State v. Joseph, 92 N.C. App. 203, 374 S.E.2d 132 (1988),*cert. denied,
324 N.C. 115, 377 S.E.2d 241 (1989) (court of appeals holding that the enactment
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1444(d) establishes the only instances in which
immediate review of interlocutory appeals are permitted in criminal cases,
eliminating the application of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) and substantial rights
analysis in criminal appeals); Southern Uniform Rentals v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins.
Co., 90 N.C. App. 738, 370 S.E.2d 76 (1988) (denial of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted does not affect a
substantial right); Burlington Industries v. Richmond County, 90 N.C. App. 577,
369 S.E.2d 119 (1988) (holding that denial of motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction does not affect a substantial right; holding that denial of
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
does not affect a substantial right; finding that denial of motion to dismiss based
on sovereign immunity is a question of procedural irregularity rather than
immunity from prosecution, therefore no substantial right affected); Poret v.
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dismiss has been held to affect a substantial right when the
motion was based on the defenses of qualified immunity and sov-
ereign immunity.124 It has also been held that the denial of a Rule
12(b) motion to- dismiss may be subject to immediate review
"where a decision of the principal question presented would expe-
dite the administration of justice, or where the case involves a
legal issue of public importance," such that it is appropriate for an
appellate court to exercise its discretion to determine the appeal
on its merits. 12
5
2. Partial Dismissal as to the Parties
An order dismissing less than all the parties to an action is
interlocutory and will only affect a substantial right where the dis-
missals involve issues which overlap those addressed in the action
against the remaining parties. 126 So long as the dismissal of less
than all of the parties does not involve an overlapping of issues, no
substantial right is affected. 127
State Personnel Comm'n, 74 N.C. App. 536, 328 S.E.2d 880, discretionary review
denied, 314 N.C. 117, 332 S.E.2d 491 (1985) (no. substantial right affected by the
denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; finding that
issue of personal jurisdiction.is a question of the ripeness of the subject matter of
administrative decisions for judicial review, therefore N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(b)
does not apply); Berger v. Berger, 67 N.C. App. 591, 313 S.E.2d 825,
discretionary review denied, 311 N.C. 303, 317 S.E.2d 678 (1984) (no substantial
right affected by the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or failure to state a claim).
124. Faulkenbury v. Teachers' & State Employees' Retirement Sys., 108 N.C.
App. 357, 424 S.E.2d 420, aff'd, 335 N.C. 158, 436 S.E.2d 821 (1993).
125. Bardolph v. Arnold, 112 N.C. App. 190, 193, 435 S.E.2d 109, 112,
discretionary review denied, 335 N.C. 552, 439 S.E.2d 141 (1993) (whether
county commissioners may be held liable for expenditures of county funds used to
produce and distribute information concerning referenda before the commission);
see also Flaherty v. Hunt, 82 N.C. App. 112, 113, 345 S.E.2d 426, 427,
discretionary review denied, 318 N.C. 505, 349 S.E.2d 859 (1986) (citizens and
taxpayers seek to recover monetary damages from the governor of North
Carolina for misuse of state property while in office).
126. Plummer v. Kearney, 108 N.C. App. 310, 423 S.E.2d 526 (1992).
127. Id. at 314, 423 S.E.2d at 529-30. In Plummer, the theory of liability
against those defendants who were dismissed differed from the issue of
compensability against the defendant who remained a party to the action. Id. at
314, 423 S.E.2d at 529. Therefore, even if the appellant prevailed on his appeal
of the dismissals, there was no possibility of inconsistent verdicts upon remand.
Id. at 314, 423 S.E.2d at 529-30.
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The opposite result was reached in Jenkins v. Wheeler. 128 The
court of appeals held that where "multiple trials against different
members of the same allegedly collusive group could result from
dismissal of this appeal," a substantial right of the plaintiff was
affected.
129
3. Partial Dismissal as to Claims
Generally, the dismissal of fewer than all the claims against a
party or parties will affect a substantial right of a plaintiff.1 0 The
basis for so determining lies in the following: where common fact
issues exist between those claims which have been dismissed and
those which remain, delay of the appeal creates the possibility
that a second trial upon the same facts will be required as the
result of a successful appeal of the dismissals. 131 This scenario
creates the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, thereby affecting a
substantial right of the plaintiff.' 32 The primary instance where
128. 69 N.C. App. 140, 316 S.E.2d 354, discretionary review denied, 311 N.C.
758, 321 S.E.2d 136 (1984).
129. Id. at 142, 316 S.E.2d at 356 (plaintiff brought suit against the named
defendant, her attorney, and Nationwide Insurance Co., alleging the three
conspired to deny plaintiff's recovery under a Nationwide policy, thereby
breaching various fiduciary duties; the attorney's motion to dismiss was
granted). See also Hoots v. Pryor, 106 N.C. App. 397, 417 S.E.2d 269,
discretionary review denied, 332 N.C. 345, 421 S.E.2d 148 (1992) (Despite the
difference in claims against co-defendants-a claim of negligence against
defendant Pryor and a claim based on interest in land and corresponding duty
against defendant Gas Company-the defense of contributory negligence could
be raised by both defendants. The resulting possibility of inconsistent verdicts
regarding contributory negligence affected a substantial right of plaintiff.).
130. Davidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, Inc., 93 N.C. App. 20, 376 S.E.2d 488,
discretionary review denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 772 (1989).
131. Id. at 25, 376 S.E.2d at 491.
132. Id. See also Fox v. Wilson, 85 N.C. App. 292, 354 S.E.2d 737 (1987)
(dismissal of a claim against a professional corporation affected the plaintiff's
substantial right to have determined in a single proceeding whether the plaintiff
had been damaged by the actions of one, some, or all of the defendants; the court
of appeals noting that all the claims arose out of the same series of transactions);
Small v. Small, 93 N.C. App. 614, 379 S.E.2d 273, discretionary review denied,
325 N.C. 273, 384 S.E.2d 519 (1989) (contract claims remaining contained issues
which overlapped the dismissed counterclaim for equitable distribution); Hare v.
Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693, 394 S.E.2d 231, discretionary review denied, 327 N.C.
634, 399 S.E.2d 121 (1990) (dismissal of various claims brought against multiple
governmental agencies; the dismissal of less than all the claims against less than
all parties affected a substantial right); Driver v. Burlington Aviation, Inc., 110
N.C. App. 519, 430 S.E.2d 476 (1993) (dismissal of claims against Cessna while
retaining claims against Burlington Aviation affected the plaintiff's substantial
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the issue of partial dismissal of claims arises and a substantial
right has been consistently held to be affected is in cases where a
claim for punitive damages has been dismissed, as in the case of
Oestreicher v. American National Stores, Inc.,133 and its progeny.
However, in Moose v. Nissan of Statesville, Inc., 134 the court of
appeals expressly overturned Oestreicher, and therefore its prog-
eny, finding that there is no danger of inconsistent verdicts
involved in such cases, and therefore no substantial right is
affected. 135
4. Miscellaneous
In Thomson v. Newman,136 the court of appeals held that
where the entire claim of plaintiff #1 was dismissed and the claim
of punitive damages brought by plaintiff #2 was dismissed, leav-
ing only the claim for compensatory damages brought by plaintiff
#2, the appeal of the dismissals was interlocutory, not affecting a
substantial right of either plaintiff.137
In Garris v. Garris,l z the trial court's dismissal of the
defendant's plea in bar to the plaintiff's claims for equitable distri-
bution and alimony was not immediately appealable, as the
court's ruling was analogous to denying a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's claims despite the assertion of some affirmative
defense.139
right to have determined in a single action whether one, some, or all of the
defendants were liable for damages arising upon the same series of transactions).
133. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
134. 115 N.C. App. 423, 444 S.E.2d 694 (1994).
135. Id. at 427-28, 444 S.E.2d at 697-98. For a more detailed explanation of
the reasoning in Moose and its relationship to the line of cases beginning with
Oestreicher, see infra notes 311-24 and accompanying text. Because Moose may
well be reviewed by the supreme court, the following cases are included herein as
they are controlling pending the outcome of that review: Huff v. Chrismon, 68
N.C. App. 525, 315 S.E.2d 711, discretionary review denied, 311 N.C. 756, 321
S.E.2d 134 (1984) (dismissal of punitive damages claim); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 81
N.C. App. 512, 344 S.E.2d 371 (1986) (same); Greer v. Parsons, 103 N.C. App.
463, 405 S.E.2d 921 (1991), aff'd, 331 N.C. 368, 416 S.E.2d 174 (1992) (dismissal
of claims for punitive damages and for loss of companionship and services in
wrongful death action, retaining the claim for pain and suffering).
136. 74 N.C. App. 597, 328 S.E.2d 597 (1985).
137. Id. at 598, 328 S.E.2d at 597.
138. 92 N.C. App. 467, 374 S.E.2d 638 (1988).
139. Id. at 470, 374 S.E.2d at 640.
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M. Family Law
1. Alimony
The issue of alimony as it relates to the question of interlocu-
tory appeals arises in pendente lite awards. The court of appeals
has recognized that appeals from this type of award are often
"pursued for the purpose of delay rather than to accelerate deter-
mination of the parties' rights," and for that reason has decided
that in the interests of public policy pendente lite awards will be
deemed not to affect a substantial right.140
In Rehm v. Rehm, 141 the court of appeals held that an order
terminating a party's obligation to pay alimony affected a substan-
tial right of the dependent spouse and was therefore immediately
appealable. 142 The ruling was based on Piedmont Equipment Co.
v. Weant, 141 in which a substantial right was deemed affected
because the order dismissing a charge of indirect civil contempt
left no other proceeding by which the plaintiff could enforce its
rights.14
2. Custody
An order for temporary child custody is interlocutory and does
not affect a substantial right which cannot be protected by appeal
140. Berger v. Berger, 67 N.C. App. 591, 597, 313 S.E.2d 825, 830,
discretionary review denied, 311 N.C. 303, 317 S.E.2d 678 (1984) (quoting
Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 251-52, 285 S.E.2d 281, 282
(1981)). See also Prevatte v. Prevatte, 104 N.C. App. 777, 411 S.E.2d 386 (1991)
(appeal of the denial of a motion to terminate alimony dismissed as interlocutory
where the subject alimony is a pendente lite award); Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C.
App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991); Wilson v. Wilson, 90 N.C. App. 144, 367 S.E.2d
363 (1988); Berry v. Berry, 87 N.C. App. 624, 361 S.E.2d 771 (1987) (court of
appeals determining that the language of the trial court imposing alimony
"pending further Orders of the Court" demonstrates the non-final character of
the order). In Berger, the defendant's third appeal from the pendente lite award
was accompanied by a contempt order for failure to comply with the
requirements of the award. Since a contempt order affects a substantial right, in
this instance the merits of the appeal were addressed. See supra notes 49-55 and
accompanying text.
141. 104 N.C. App. 490, 409 S.E.2d 723 (1991).
142. Id. at 494, 409 S.E.2d at 725.
143. 30 N.C. App. 191, 226 S.E.2d 688 (1976).
144. Rehm, 104 N.C. App. at 494, 409 S.E.2d at 725.
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from the final judgment.14 5 An order continuing in effect a tempo-
rary child custody order is likewise non-appealable. 146
3. Child Support
In Appert v. Appert,147 the trial court entered an order in
which the defendant father was permitted to place his child sup-
port payments into an escrow account to ensure that his visitation
rights as bargained for in a separation agreement were complied
with.' 48 The order was deemed to affect a substantial right of the
plaintiff to receive support on behalf of her minor children as
needed and in the amount deemed by the trial court to be reason-
ably necessary. 14
9
In keeping with the philosophy espoused in Berger v. Ber-
ger,'150 regarding the public policy against appealing awards of ali-
mony pendente lite,' 5 1 orders for child support entered in
conjunction with alimony pendente lite awards are not appealable
until a final judgment is entered for permanent alimony.'5 2
4. Paternity-Blood Grouping Tests
An order requiring parties and their minor child to submit to
a blood grouping test in order to establish paternity is interlocu-
tory and does not affect a substantial right. 53 However, because
the public interest is best served by an expedited decision in cases
involving paternity, the trend in the court of appeals is to address
the merits of these cases regardless of their interlocutory
status.'
5 4
145. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 81 N.C. App. 675, 344 S.E.2d 806, discretionary review
denied, 318 N.C. 505, 349 S.E.2d 859 (1986).
146. Berkman v. Berkman, 106 N.C. App. 701, 417 S.E.2d 831 (1992).
147. 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).
148. Id. at 28, 341 S.E.2d at 342.
149. Id. at 33, 341 S.E.2d at 345.
150. 67 N.C. App. 591, 313 S.E.2d 825, discretionary review denied, 311 N.C.
303, 317 S.E.2d 678 (1984).
151. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
152. Berger, 67 N.C. App. at 597-98, 313 S.E.2d at 830. See also, Fliehr v.
Fliehr, 56 N.C. App. 465, 289 S.E.2d 105 (1982).
153. State ex rel. Hill v. Manning, 110 N.C. App. 770, 431 S.E.2d 207 (1993).
154. Id. See also Person County ex rel. Lester v. Holloway, 74 N.C. App. 734,
329 S.E.2d 713 (1985); Heavner v. Heavner, 73 N.C. App. 331, 326 S.E.2d 78,
discretionary review denied, 313 N.C. 601, 330 S.E.2d 610 (1985).
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5. Guardian Ad Litem
In Culton v. Culton, 55 the plaintiff appealed from an order
granting the defendant's motions for the appointment of a guard-
ian ad litem.156 The court found that the order was not a final
judgment, and that no substantial right of the plaintiff was
affected. 1
57
N. Indemnity
An appeal from an order which denies a claim for indemnity is
premature in that the liability of the movant has not yet been
established, therefore neither has the need for indemnification. 58
For this reason, no substantial right of the appellant has been
affected by the ruling.15 9
0. Injunctions
By its very nature, a preliminary injunction is interlocutory.
It is imposed in order to preserve the status quo pending a final
determination on the merits of a case.' 60 As such, the appealabil-
ity of either the denial or imposition of a temporary injunction
requires a showing that the appellant will be deprived of a sub-
stantial right absent immediate review.' 6 '
1. Substantial Right Affected
a. Covenants not to Compete
The most common challenge to a trial court's ruling on a pre-
liminary injunction on appeal is where the grounds for the injunc-
tion involve a covenant not to compete. For the most part,
covenants which restrict a party's ability to operate a business or
155. 327 N.C. 624, 398 S.E.2d 323 (1990).
156. Id. at 625, 398 S.E.2d at 324.
157. Id. at 626, 398 S.E.2d at 325. It is noted that the Culton court also
determined that the plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the appointment
as he was not an aggrieved party. Id. It is not clear in the opinion to what extent
the plaintiff's lack of standing formed the basis of the dismissal of the appeal,
and whether a party with standing might have a better chance at establishing
the abridgment of a substantial right.
•158. Telerent Leasing Corp. v. Barbee, 102 N.C. App. 129, 130, 401 S.E.2d 122,
123 (1991).
159. Id.
160. A.E.P. Indus:, Inc. v. McClure, 308 N.C. 393, 400, 302 S.E.2d 754, 759
(1983).
161. Id.
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practice their livelihood are found to affect a substantial right.
Where the injunction has been denied, the fact that the duration
of the non-competing covenant will run prior to final judgment
and appellate review, rendering the issue moot, has been held to
affect a substantial right. The following cases are illustrative of
injunctions concerning covenants not to compete.
In Robins & Weill, Inc. v. Mason, 162 the court of appeals held
that because the terms of the covenant forbade the defendants
from "engaging in the general insurance business" for a period of
three years, a substantial right of the defendants' was affected.
163
The court of appeals noted that the "trial court's enforcement of
the covenant has effectively closed the defendants out of the insur-
ance business in the territory where they have recently begun an
insurance agency of their own."164 Similarly, in Triangle Leasing
Co. v. McMahon, 165 the court of appeals found a substantial right
was affected when the covenant not to compete prohibited the
defendants from practicing their livelihood in North Carolina
after they had opened a business to do so shortly before the plain-
tiffifiled suit.166 The ability to do business, particularly a seasonal
business, was held to be a substantial right affected by the imposi-
tion of a preliminary injunction enforcing a covenant not to com-
pete against the defendant air-conditioning installation business
in Milner Airco, Inc. v. Morris.16 v Additionally, the right to work
and earn a living in North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia,
Georgia, and Alabama was held to be a substantial right affected
by the injunction entered in Masterclean of North Carolina, Inc.
v. Guy. 168
The denial of an injunction to enforce a covenant not to com-
pete was held to affect a substantial right of the plaintiff where, at
the time of the appeal, more than one-third of the period in which
the covenant was to run had elapsed. 169 The issue of the running
time of a covenant was raised again in Electrical South, Inc., v.
162. 70 N.C. App. 537, 320 S.E.2d 693, discretionary review denied, 312 N.C
495, 322 S.E.2d 559 (1984).
163. Id. at 540, 320 S.E.2d at 696.
164. Id.
165. 96 N.C. App. 140, 385 S.E.2d 360 (1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 327
N.C. 224, 393 S.E.2d 854 (1990).
166. Id. at 146, 385 S.E.2d at 363.
167. 111 N.C. App. 866, 869, 433 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1993).
168. 82 N.C. App. 45, 47, 345 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1986).
169. Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App. 21, 24, 373
S.E.2d 449, 451 (1988), aff'd, 324 N.C. 327, 377 S.E.2d 750 (1989).
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Lewis.170 The court of appeals found a substantial right of the
plaintiff was affected because absent immediate appellate review
the two year limitation of the covenant would expire prior to a
final judgment on the merits. 171
b. Others
In Town of Knightdale v. Vaughn,'72 an injunction was
entered pursuant to zoning regulations prohibiting the defendant
from operating a used car sales lot. 173 In reasoning similar to that
in the above cases, the court of appeals determined that the right
of the defendant to operate his business until the merits of the
case were adjudicated was substantial. 174 Similarly, an injunc-
tion granting possession of church property to the plaintiffs and
ordering the eviction of the pastor was held to affect a substantial
right of the defendants. 17 5
In North Carolina Electric Membership Corp. v. North Caro-
lina Department of Economic & Community Development, 176 the
injunction appealed from required the North Carolina Rural Elec-
trification Authority to release documents to Duke Power Com-
pany, whose right to those documents formed the subject of the
underlying case. 177 The court of appeals held that because compli-
ance with the injunction would render the underlying case moot, a
substantial right was affected which the appellant would lose if
review was not immediate. 178
The rights and freedoms safeguarded by the First Amend-
ment were held to be substantial in Kaplan v. Prolife Action
League. 179 In Kaplan, the injunction appealed from prohibited
anti-abortionist defendants, who had targeted abortion-perform-
ing Dr. Kaplan, from picketing, parading, marching or demon-
strating within a specified distance from the plaintiffs' home, and
170. 96 N.C. App. 160, 385 S.E.2d 352 (1989), discretionary review denied, 326
N.C. 595, 393 S.E.2d 876 (1990).
171. Id. at 165, 385 S.E.2d at 355.
172. 95 N.C. App. 649, 383 S.E.2d 460 (1989).
173. Id. at 650, 383 S.E.2d at 461.
174. Id. at 651, 383 S.E.2d at 461.
175. Looney v. Wilson, 97 N.C. App. 304, 388 S.E.2d 142 (1990).
176. 108 N.C. App. 711, 425 S.E.2d 440 (1993).
177. Id. at 715, 425 S.E.2d at 443.
178. Id. at 716, 425 S.E.2d at 443.
179. 111 NC. App. 1, 431 S.E.2d 828, discretionary review denied, 335 N.C.
175, 436 S.E.2d 379 (1993).
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from confronting or threatening the plaintiffs at their home or
elsewhere.18 0
2. No Substantial Right Affected
In Yandle v. Mecklenburg County,""' the Yandles sought to
have the Town of Matthews annex a piece of their property to pre-
vent the County of Mecklenburg from condemning the land for a
land fill.18 2 The trial court entered a preliminary injunction
prohibiting Matthews from annexing the property, and prohibit-
ing the county from condemning the property.'8 3 The injunction
was found not to affect a substantial right of either the county or
the town as neither would be irrevocably harmed by the mainte-
nance of the status. quo.'8 4
In Carefree Carolina Communities, Inc. v. Cilley,185 plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction stopping foreclosure against
the plaintiff was denied. 186 The court of appeals did not determine
that a substantial right of the plaintiff's was affected by the denial
of the motion, but instead decided to expedite the decision in the
public interest by suspending the rules regarding interlocutory
appeals.18 7
E & J Investments, Inc., was prevented by a preliminary
injunction from offering topless dancing at their lounge.'l 8  The
court of appeals noted that no substantial right of the defendant
was affected, since there was no injunction preventing the defend-
ant from operating the lounge business, serving alcohol, or having
180. Id. at 10, 431 S.E.2d at 831-32.
181. 77 N.C. App. 660, 335 S.E.2d 915 (1985).
182. Id. at 661, 335 S.E.2d at 915.
183. Id. at 661, 335 S.E.2d at 916.
184. Id. at 662, 335 S.E.2d at 916. It is noted that the trial court's injunction
prohibiting the Yandles from conveying the property during the pendency of the
action was vacated by the court of appeals. Id. No substantial right was found
affected, but it was held that the trial court had no authority to enter the
injunction as it was not reasonably necessary to protect any of the parties' rights.
Id.
185. 79 N.C. App. 742, 340 S.E.2d 529, discretionary review denied, 316 N.C.
374, 342 S.E.2d 891 (1986).
186. Id. at 743, 340 S.E.2d at 530.
187. Id. at 744, 340 S.E.2d at 530.
188. City of Fayetteville v. E & J Investments, Inc., 90 N.C. App. 268, 368
S.E.2d 20, discretionary review denied, 323 N.C. 171, 373 S.E.2d 105 (1988).
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dancing (albeit non-topless). l 9 Since the injunction was so lim-
ited, no irreparable harm to the defendant was foreseen. 190
A preliminary injunction restraining the defendant bank from
selling shares of stock it controlled as executor of an estate did not
affect a substantial right of the bank.191 The injunction was
deemed temporary, enjoining the sale only until the trial court
could determine whether the bank was required to sell the shares
to the plaintiff as he alleged.192 I I
The sole example found -where a covenant not to compete was
deemed not to affect a substantial right is Automated Data Sys-
tems v. Meyers.'93 The court of appeals found that under the facts
of the case an injunction barred the defendant from competing
with the plaintiff in several counties, none of which corresponded
with the operational territory of the defendant's new place of
employment.19 Since the injunction had no affect on the defend-
ant's employment and the defendant was not enjoined from any
activity in which he was engaged prior to. the entry of the injunc-
tion, no substantial right was affected. 195
In Clark v. Craven Regional Medical Authority, 196 the
supreme court held that an injunction restraining the plaintiffs
from enforcing stop work orders where the defendants' counter-
claim for damages resulting from the negligent issuance of the
plaintiffs' orders had not been decided did not affect a substantial
right of the plaintiffs. 197 Further, the court noted that the plain-
tiffs failed to argue that they would be deprived of any substantial
right absent immediate review. 198
P. Intervention
In Howell v. Howell,199 the court of appeals determined that
the denial of a motion for permissive intervention under section
189. Id. at 270, 368 S.E.2d at 21.
190. Id..
191. Shuping v. NCNB, 93 N.C. App. 338, 377 S.E.2d 802 (1989).
192. Id. at 340, 377 S.E.2d at 803.
193. 96 N.C. App. 624, 386 S.E.2d 432 (1989).
194. Id. at 626, 386 S.E.2d at 434.
195. Id. at 627, 386 S.E.2d at 434.
196. 326 N.C. 15, 387 S.E.2d 168 (1990).
197. Id. at 23, 387 S.E.2d at 173.
198. Id.
199. 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181-(1988).
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1A-1, Rule 24(b), of the General Statutes of North Carolina did not
affect a substantial right.200
Q. Jurisdiction
1. Personal Jurisdiction
Section 1-277(b) of the General Statutes of North Carolina
provides that "[ay interested party shall have the right of imme-
diate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person or property of the defendant or such party
may preserve his exception for determination upon any subse-
quent appeal in the cause."20 1 This provision recognizes that the
issue raised in a motion to dismiss on these grounds applies to the
authority of the state to bring the defendant into its courts.2 °2
The right to an immediate appeal under this section is limited to
the issue of whether the defendant has the "minimum contacts"
necessary to establish jurisdiction over the person.2 °3 Further,
this right extends to a denial of a motion for summary judgment,
otherwise not immediately appealable.2 °4 It is important to note,
however, that the right to immediate appeal of this issue is not
automatic, and requires more than simply making the motion.20 5
200. Id. at 118, 365 S.E.2d at 183. In the underlying case, counsel for the
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of alimony pendente
lite. Id. at 116, 365 S.E.2d at 182. A few days later, the defendant discharged
her counsel. Id. At that time, counsel made a motion to intervene for the
purpose of securing attorney's fees incurred in the preparation of the motion for
summary judgment. Id. At the time the motion to intervene was fied, however,
the summary judgment issue had not yet been addressed by the trial court. Id.
The trial court, noting that until the alimony question was answered counsel was
not entitled to any fees, denied the motion. Id. It was noted that the appellant
could bring either a separate action for fees or appeal from a final order in the
underlying case. Id. at 117, 365 S.E.2d at 182.
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(b) (1983). See also Combustion Sys. Sales v.
Hatfield Htg. & Air Conditioning Co., 102 N.C. App. 751, 403 S.E.2d 600 (1991).
202. Howard v. Ocean Trail Convalescent Center, 68 N.C. App. 494, 496, 315
S.E.2d 97, 99 (1984) (citing Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d 141 (1982)).
203. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Richmond County, DOT, 90 N.C. App. 577, 580,
369 S.E.2d 119, 121 (1988) (citing Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d 141
(1982)).
204. Hargett v. Reed, 95 N.C. App. 292, 382 S.E.2d 791 (1989).
205. Poret v. State Personnel Comm'n, 74 N.C. App. 536, 539, 328 S.E.2d 880,
882, discretionary review denied, 314 N.C. 117, 332 S.E.2d 491 (1985), overruled
on other issues by Batten v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 326 N.C. 338,
343, 389 S.E.2d 35, 39 (1990).
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The substance of the motion rather than the form controls the
interlocutory nature of the appeal.2 °6
In Berger v. Berger,2 °7 the court of appeals focused on the
right to immediate appeal based on section 1-277(b). It was held
that in applying the statute to determine the defendant's right to
appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, it was necessary to examine the underlying motion:
If defendant's motion raises a due process question of whether his
contacts within the forum state were sufficient to justify the
court's jurisdictional power over him, then the order denying such
motion is immediately appealable under G.S. 1-277(b). If, on the
other hand, defendant's motion, though couched in terms of lack of
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), actually raises a question of suffi-
ciency of service or process, then the order denying such motion is
interlocutory and does not fall within* the ambit of G.S. 1-
277(b).2 °s
The question of whether a court of another state has personal
jurisdiction over a defendant has been found not to affect a sub-
stantial right.20 9 In Automotive Restyling Concepts, Inc. v. Central
Service Lincoln Mercury, the defendant appealed the denial of a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, claiming that a
Virginia judgment against it which the plaintiff sought to enforce
was void in North Carolina because Virginia lacked personal juris-
diction over the defendant.210 The court of appeals stated that
there was no question regarding this state's jurisdiction over the
defendant, therefore, no substantial right was affected by the
denial of the motion to dismiss.211
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under section 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1), of the General Stat-
utes of North Carolina is interlocutory and does not affect a sub-
stantial right, and therefore is not immediately appealable.212
206. Id.
207. 67 N.C. App. 591, 313 S.E.2d 825, discretionary review denied, 311 N.C.
303, 317 S.E.2d 678 (1984).
208. Id. at 595, 313 S.E.2d at 828-29.
209. Automotive Restyling Concepts, Inc., v. Central Service Lincoln Mercury,
87 N.C. App. 173, 360 S.E.2d 141 (1987).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 173-74, 360 S.E.2d at 142.
212. Berger v. Berger, 67 N.C. App. 591, 313 S.E.2d 825, discretionary review
denied, 311 N.C. 303, 317 S.E.2d 678 (1984). See also Walleshauser v.
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Under section 1-277(a) of the General Statutes of North Carolina,
however, an order finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
immediately appealable because it determines or discontinues the
action.2 13
R. Jury Trials
It is well established that an order denying'jury trial affects a
substantial right and is, therefore, immediately appealable.214 In
Faircloth v. Beard,2 15 the supreme court extended that holding,
finding that if an order denying a jury trial warranted immediate
review, an order requiring a jury trial should have the same
affect.216
S. Partial Verdict
An order containing a partial verdict-a verdict adjudicating
less than all of the claims or all the rights and liabilities of all the
parties to an action-is interlocutory and requires a finding that
absent immediate appellate review a substantial right of the
appellant will be affected.217
1. Substantial Right Affected
In City of Winston-Salem v. Ferrell,2 18 the plaintiff filed a Dec-
laration of Taking describing permanent and construction ease-
ments across certain property owned by defendants. 219 The
Walleshauser, 100 N.C. App. 594, 397 S.E.2d 371 (1990) (an order retaining
jurisdiction over a child custody issue does not affect a substantial right and is
not immediately appealable).
213. Batten v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 326 N.C. 338, 389 S.E.2d 35
(1990). It is noted that if a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is granted to fewer than all the claims or parties, the appealability
will turn on whether there is a substantial right affected in each case. Id. at 342,
389 S.E.2d at 38. See Willis P. Whichard, Appealability in North Carolina:
Common Law Definition of the Statutory Substantial Right Doctrine, 47 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 127-28, n. 33 (1984).
214. In re McCarroll, 313 N.C. 315, 327 S.E.2d 880 (1985); Dick Parker Ford,
Inc., v. Bradshaw, 102 N.C. App. 529, 402 S.E.2d 878 (1991); In re Ferguson, 50
N.C. App. 681, 274 S.E.2d 879 (1981).
215. 320 N.C. 505, 358 S.E.2d 512 (1987).
216. Id. at 507, 358 S.E.2d at 514. See also State ex rel. Rhodes v. Simpson,
325 N.C. 514, 385 S.E.2d 329 (1989); State ex rel. Rhodes v. Givens, 101 N.C.
App. 695, 400 S.E.2d 745 (1991).
217. Donnelly v. Guilford County, 107 N.C. App. 289, 419 S.E.2d 365 (1992).
218. 79 N.C. App. 103, 338 S.E.2d 794 (1986).
219. Id. at 106, 338 S.E.2d at 797.
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defendants counterclaimed, seeking damages for inverse condem-
nation which occurred on property not included in the Declaration
of Taking but which had been trespassed upon by the contractor
hired by the city.22 0 The city then filed a third-party action seek-
ing indemnification by the contractor for any liability established
in favor of the defendants. 22' The trial court entered a partial ver-
dict in favor of the defendants' counterclaim, establishing the
city's liability but not determining damages.222 Both the city and
the contractor appealed. 223 The court of appeals found a substan-
tial right of the city was affected based on the allegation of inverse
condemnation.22 ' In ruling on the appealability of the issues
raised by the third-party defendant contractor, the court of
appeals held that when "a third-party defendant has an opportu-
nity to participate fully in the determination of third-party plain-
tiff's liability, it is bound by a judgment in favor of the original
plaintiff (here, the defendants by counterclaim)." 225 For this rea-
son, the court of appeals held that the order determining the lia-
bility of the city affected a substantial right of the contractor.226
A partial verdict which leaves overlapping issues between the
claim decided and the claim remaining affects a substantial right
of the appellant because common allegations present common fac-
tual issues which should be determined by the same jury.227
2. No Substantial Right Affected
In Donnelly v. Guilford County, 228 the plaintiff employee filed
suit against the county for his employment termination, alleging
violations of his state and federal constitutional rights, and pray-
ing for relief in the form of a preliminary injunction, reinstate-
ment, promotion, compensatory pay, compensatory and punitive
damages, and attorney's fees.229 The jury returned verdicts
regarding only two issues: (1) whether the plaintiff had waived
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 107, 338 S.E.2d at 797. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying
text.
225. City of Winston-Salem, 79 N.C. App. at 107, 338 S.E.2d at 797.
226. Id.
227. Britt v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 97 N.C. App. 442, 388 S.E.2d 613
(1990).
228. 107 N.C. App. 289, 419 S.E.2d 365 (1992).
229. Id. at 290, 419 S.E.2d at 366.
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his right to a post-termination hearing, and (2) the amount recov-
erable in money damages by the plaintiff.23 0 The jury awarded
the plaintiff nominal damages of one dollar. 231 The defendants
appealed from the award of one dollar and from the denial of their
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.23 2 The court of
appeals determined that payment of one dollar would not work
such hardship against the defendants as to affect a substantial
right.233 Further, since the judgment appealed from did not
resolve all of the claims against the defendants, the order denying
the defendants' motion was interlocutory and not immediately
appealable.234
A partial verdict resulting in a judgment which determines
the issue of liability but does not resolve the issue of damages is
interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right.23 5
T. Plea Bargains
A defendant has a substantial due process right not to have
the state withdraw from a plea arrangement once the bargain has
been accepted by the trial court.236 For that reason, an order
which grants the state's motion to do so is immediately
appealable.23 7
U. , Release of Funds
In State ex rel. Commissioner of Insurance v. North Carolina
Rate Bureau,238 the court of appeals held that no substantial right
was affected where the order complained of denied the Rate
Bureau's motion to release funds held in escrow.23 9 The denial
was held to be temporary, and the order did not purport to deter-
mine who was entitled to the funds, only that they were not to be
released at that time.240 Under these facts, the Rate Bureau
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 292, 419 S.E.2d at 367.
234. Id. at 293, 419 S.E.2d at 368.
235. Johnston v. Royal Indemnity Co., 107 N.C. App. 624, 421 S.E.2d 170
(1992).
236. State v. Johnson, 95 N.C. App. 757, 758, 383 S.E.2d 692, 693 (1989).
237. Id.
238. 102 N.C. App. 809, 403 S.E.2d 597 (1991).
239. Id. at 811, 403 S.E.2d at 599.
240. Id.
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failed to show that any right regarded as substantial would be lost
prior to final judgment.24 1
V. Setting Aside Judgment
A plaintiff's appeal from an order setting aside a judgment
which had been based on a purported confession of judgment is
interlocutory, and does not affect a substantial right where the
result of the order is only that the plaintiff must establish the
defendants' liability and the resultant damages by proper
evidence.242
W. Summary Judgment
The question of the appealability of an interlocutory order,
based on the order affecting a substantial right, arises most fre-
quently in cases involving orders of summary judgment. As stated
earlier, an appeal from a grant of summary judgment which dis-
poses of fewer than all the parties or less than all the claims is
immediately appealable upon certification by the trial court that
there is no just reason for delay.2 43 It should be noted, however,
that under Rule 54(b) certification by the trial court does not
require appellate review from orders denying a motion for sum-
mary judgment.2 " The denial of a motion for summary judgment,
as well as a partial summary judgment order which is not certified
by the trial court pursuant to Rule 54(b), is appealable only upon
showing that a substantial right has been affected.245
It is important to note that under the statutes, the burden of
showing that a substantial right of the appellant is affected falls
on the appellant. This may seem obvious, but often an appellant
will not address the interlocutory nature of his case in the brief.
In the past the appellate courts have addressed the issue on their
own, absent any argument presented by either side, and deter-
mined whether there is a substantial right affected under case law
prior to reviewing the issues raised on appeal. This trend recently
241. Id.
242. First American Savings & Loan v. Satterfield, 87 N.C. App. 160, 163, 359
S.E.2d 812, 814 (1987).
243. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (1990).
244. See Henderson v. LeBauer, 101 N.C. App. 255, 399 S.E.2d 142,
discretionary review denied, 328 N.C. 731, 404 S.E.2d 868 (1991); Fraser v. Di
Santi, 75 N.C. App. 654, 331 S.E.2d 217, discretionary review denied, 315 N.C.
183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985).
245. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(dXl) (1990).
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came under scrutiny in Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture,248
wherein the court of appeals held that it is not the duty of the
appellate courts to construct arguments on behalf of an appellant.
Therefore, the appellant's failure to present an argument in sup-
port of the abridgment of a substantial right is fatal to his
appeal. 247
In organizing the cases involving orders of summary judg-
ment, there is necessarily some overlapping with other sections of
this paper. For purposes of clarity, this section is divided into four
sub-sections: denial of summary judgment, substantial right not
affected; denial of summary judgment, substantial right affected;
partial summary judgment, substantial right not affected; partial
summary judgment, substantial right affected. Where applicable,
cases are grouped within each section according to subject matter.
1. Denial of Summary Judgment: Substantial Right Not
Affected
In Fraser v. Di Santi,248 an action in which the defendants
were accused of committing professional malpractice, the court of
appeals noted that the denial of the defendants' summary judg-
ment motion was not a final determination of the defendants'
rights.2 4 9 It was further determined that no substantial rights of
the defendants were affected by the decision of the trial court.250
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed pursuant to section 7A-27
of the General Statutes of North Carolina, despite the trial court
having stated that "there is no just reason to delay the appeal."25 '
A similar dismissal of appeal occurred in Henderson v.
LeBauer,252 where the court of appeals held that the denial of the
defendant hospital's motion for summary judgment did not affect
246. 115 N.C. App. 377, 380, 444 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1994).
247. Id. The court did not reach the issue of whether the order granting
summary judgment would result in prejudice to a substantial right of the
appellant. Id. at 379, 444 S.E.2d at 253. The fact that no substantial rights
argument was raised ended appellate review of the appeal which was summarily
dismissed. Id. Jeffreys was filed on 23 August 1994 and so has not been subject
to review by the supreme court at the time of this writing.
248. 75 N.C. App. 654, 331 S.E.2d 217, discretionary review denied, 315 N.C.
183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985).
249. Id. at 655, 331 S.E.2d at 218.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 101 N.C. App. 255, 399 S.E.2d 142, discretionary review denied, 328 N.C.
731, 404 S.E.2d 868 (1991).
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a substantial right and was not immediately appealable, despite
the trial court's certification for appeal under section 1A-1, Rule
54(b), of the General Statutes of North Carolina.25 3
In Cagle v. Teachy,254 the plaintiff's insurer, an unnamed
party under section 20-279.21 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina, attempted to appeal the denial of its motion for sum-
mary judgment made on the grounds that the plaintiff's unin-
sured motorist coverage had been exhausted.2 5 The court of
appeals found that no substantial right of the appellant was
affected by the order, as options other than immediate appeal
(bifurcation of the trial or severability of the issues, e.g.) were
available to protect it against any prejudice which might result
from having the issue of insurance coverage decided by a jury also
weighing the issue of liability.256
The denial of a motion for summary judgment appeared as an
argument on cross-appeal in Dublin v. UCR, Inc.2 5 7 The court of
appeals held that the order appealed from was interlocutory and
did not affect a substantial right.2 58
2. Denial of Summary Judgment: Substantial Right
Affected
The primary area wherein the denial of a summary judgment
motion has been held to affect a substantial right is where the
moving party claims sovereign, absolute or qualified immunity
from suit. Initially, the basis for this conclusion was grounded in
the reasoning that the doctrine of sovereign immunity presented a
question of personal jurisdiction, immediately appealable under
section 1-277(b) of the General Statutes of North Carolina.2 59 The
United States Supreme Court addressed the substantial right
aspect of the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on a
claim of immunity in Mitchell v. Forsyth.260 In Mitchell, the Court
held that "denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an
order appealable before final judgment, for the essence of absolute
253. Id. at 264, 399 S.E.2d at 147.
254. 111 N.C. App. 244, 431 S.E.2d 801 (1993).
255. Id. at 245, 431 S.E.2d at 802.
256. Id. at 246, 431 S.E.2d at 802-03.
257. 115 N.C. App. 209, 444 S.E.2d 455 (1994).
258. Id. at 224, 444 S.E.2d at 464.
259. See, e.g., Zimmer v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 87 N.C. App. 132,
360 S.E.2d 115 (1987).
260. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for
his conduct in a civil damages action."261 The Court went on to
conclude that a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it is
based on legal questions of whether a violation of "clearly estab-
lished law" occurred, is also immediately appealable as it is "an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and
like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is errone-
ously permitted to go to trial."26 2
The denial of a motion for summary judgment has also been
held to affect a substantial right where the doctrine of res judicata
is applicable. This holding is based on the established right of a
party to avoid the possibility of two trials on the same issues.2 63
Accordingly, the denial of a motion for summary judgment based
on the defense of res judicata has been held to affect a substantial
right in Bockweg v. Anderson,264 and Northwestern Financial
Group, Inc. v. County of Gaston.26 5
The final area wherein the denial of a motion for summary
judgment has been held to affect a substantial right warranting
immediate appeal is where the order denying the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment denied the plaintiff a jury trial and
261. Id. at 525.
262. Id. at 526. The holding in Mitchell is explained in Corum v. University of
N.C., 97 N.C. App. 527, 389 S.E.2d 596 (1990). The court of appeals' ruling
regarding the substantial rights issue of immunity was later affirmed by the
supreme court in Corum v. University of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276
(1992). The following cases have interpreted the substantial right aspect of
claims of immunity: Herndon v. Barrett, 101 N.C. App. 636, 400 S.E.2d 767
(1991) (claim of sovereign immunity by the defendant municipal corporation in
an action for negligent supervision of two police officers); EEE-ZZZ Lay Drain
Co. v. North Carolina Dep't Human Resources, 108 N.C. App. 24,422 S.E.2d 338
(1992) (State Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources is a
state agency immune from suit as are local health departments); Hickman v.
Fuqua, 108 N.C. App. 80, 422 S.E.2d 449 (1992), discretionary review denied, 333
N.C. 462, 427 S.E.2d 621 (1993) (municipal tennis program claims immunity
from tort liability in a personal injury suit); Slade v. Vernon, 110 N.C. App. 422,
429 S.E.2d 744 (1993) (action against a sheriff and jailer brought by prisoner
alleging injuries suffered while incarcerated); Dickens v. Thorne, 110 N.C. App.
39, 429 S.E.2d 176 (1993) (libel action filed against a county commissioner and
the county); Taylor v. Ashburn, 112 N.C. App. 604, 436 S.E.2d 276 (1993),
discretionary review denied, 336 N.C. 77, 445 S.E.2d 46 (1994) (fireman sued in
his official capacity for the negligent operation of the fire truck).
263. See Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982).
264. 333 N.C. 486, 428 S.E.2d 157 (1993).
265. 110 N.C. App. 531, 430 S.E.2d 689, discretionary review denied, 334 N.C.
621, 435 S.E.2d 337 (1993).
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"effectively determined the action" in favor of the defendant.266
This case involves the issue of the priority of claims between two
creditors.26 7 By denying the summary judgment motion of one
creditor, the court, in effect, granted priority in the claim of the.
other creditor.268
3. Partial Summary Judgment: No Substantial Right
Affected
In the following cases, a party appealed from an order grant-
ing partial summary judgment and, upon review, the court of
appeals determined that no substantial right of the appealing
party was affected by the order.
In Brown v. Brown,269 the plaintiff contended that the order
granting summary judgment exempting portions of the defend-
ant's property from her equitable distribution claims denied her
the substantial right to title in the property.270 The court of
appeals held that the possibility of waste or encumbrance during
the pendency of trial did not establish the loss of a substantial
right.271
In Beam v Morrow,272 a summary judgment order granted
against the commissioners and a real estate broker rendered cer-
tain deeds null and void.273 Remaining for later determination
were the recovery of monies paid for the property and questions of
accounting for expenditures by the commissioners.2 74 The court of
appeals held that the commissioners and the broker would suffer
no irreparable harm by waiting to appeal the summary judgment
after the trial on the remaining issues.275
In T'ai Co. v. Market Square Ltd. Partnership,276 summary
judgment was granted in favor of the defendant against the plain-
266. Peoples Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 103 N.C. App. 762,
407 S.E.2d 251, discretionary review denied, 330 N.C. 197, 412 S.E.2d 59 (1991).
267. Id. at 764, 407 S.E.2d at 252.
268. Id.
269. 77 N.C. App. 206, 334 S.E.2d 506 (1985), discretionary review denied, 315
N.C. 389, 338 S.E.2d 878 (1986).
270. Id. at 208, 334 S.E.2d at 508.
271. Id.
272. 77 N.C. App. 800, 336 S.E.2d 106 (1985), discretionary review denied, 316
N.C. 192, 341 S.E.2d 575 (1986).
273. Id. at 802, 336 S.E.2d at 107.
274. Id. at 803, 336 S.E.2d at 108.
275. Id.
276. 92 N.C. App. 234, 373 S.E.2d 885 (1988).
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tiff's claim for breach of contract.2 7 7 Remaining for trial was the
defendant's counterclaim for attorney's fees and which alleged the
plaintiff's suit to be frivolous, malicious and without merit.2 78
The court of appeals held that no substantial right of the plaintiff
would be affected prior to the trial on the defendant's
counterclaim.2 79
In Myers v. Barringer,28 0 the plaintiffs' claimed that they had
a substantial right to have a single jury decide whether the con-
duct of one, some, or all of the defendants caused injury to them
following partial summary judgment as to some of the defend-
ants.28 ' The court of appeals determined that the basis for liabil-
ity of each defendant was separate and based on a different duty
owed to the plaintiffs pursuant to the independent contractor sta-
tus of each defendant.28 2
In Miller v. Swann Plantation. Development Co., 283 an order
granting summary judgment for the plaintiff allowed him to use
an easement across the defendants' property.28 4 The court of
appeals held that the order did not affect a substantial right of the
defendant which would be lost absent immediate review.28 5
In Leonard v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co., 28 6 an order granting partial summary judgment regarding
the plaintiff's insurance coverage did not affect a substantial right
of the defendant company when the liability of the tortfeasor and
the plaintiff's damages remained to be determined.28 7
In McNeil v. Hicks,2 8 an order granting partial summary
judgment establishing the plaintiff's right to her uninsured
motorist coverage did not affect a substantial right of the defend-
277. Id. at 235, 373 S.E.2d at 886.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 236-37, 373 S.E.2d at 887.
280. 101 N.C. App. 168, 398 S.E.2d 615 (1990).
281. Id. at 173, 398 S.E.2d at 618.
282. Id.
283. 101 N.C. App. 394, 399 S.E.2d 137 (1991).
284. Id. at 394, 399 S.E.2d at 138.
285. Id. at 396, 399 S.E.2d at 139.
286. 104 N.C. App. 665, 411 S.E.2d 178 (1991), discretionary review on
additional issues denied, 331 N.C. 117, 414 S.E.2d 757, rev'd on other grounds,
332 N.C. 656, 423 S.E.2d 71 (1992).
287. Id. at 668, 411 S.E.2d at 179-80.
288. 111 N.C. App. 262, 431 S.E.2d 868 (1993), discretionary review denied,
335 N.C. 557, 441 S.E.2d 118 (1994).
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ant insurance company where the issue of damages was not yet
determined.28 9
4. Partial Summary Judgment: Substantial Right Affected
a. As to Parties
Ordinarily, where the resolution of claims against several
parties depends on the determination of factual issues common to
all defendants, the dismissal of the claims 'as to some of the
defendants will be held to affect a substantial right.2 9 0 The basis
for this holding is the plaintiff's substantial right to have one jury
decide whether one, some, none, or all of the defendants are liable
for the plaintiff's injuries.2 9 1 In the following instances, the sum-
mary judgment affecting fewer than all the parties was held to
affect a substantial right.
Federal Land Bank v. Lieben29 2 involved the respective liabil-
ities of various sureties, guarantors, the indemnitor, and the
payee on a loan. 2 9 3 Summary judgment was granted in favor of
the plaintiff bank as to some of the defendants.294 Remaining to
be decided were the bank's claim against the remaining defend-
ants and various counterclaims, cross claims, and third party
claims. 295 The court of appeals held that due to "the complexity of
the facts and the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in separate
trials, the order allowing summary judgment as to fewer than all
defendants affects a substantial right."296 Similarly, in Hooper v.
C. M. Steel, Inc.,29 7 the plaintiffs, who were in an auto accident
involving a driver for the defendant company, brought an action in
negligence against both the driver and the employer.298 Summary
judgment was entered in favor of the employer. 299 The court of
appeals held that the plaintiffs had a substantial right to have the
liability of both defendants determined in the same trial in order
to avoid the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.3 °°
289. Id. at 264, 431 S.E.2d at 869.
290. See, e.g., Baker v. Rushing, 104 N.C. App. 240, 409 S.E.2d 108 (1991).
291. Id. at 246, 409 S.E.2d at 111.
292. 86 N.C. App. 342, 357 S.E.2d 700 (1987).
293. Id. at 343, 357 S.E.2d at 701.
294. Id. at 343, 357 S.E.2d at 702.
295. Id. at 344, 357 S.E.2d at 702.
296* Id.
297. 94 N.C. App. 567, 380 S.E.2d 593 (1989).
298. Id. at 568, 380 S.E.2d at 594.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 568-69, 380 S.E.2d at 594.
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In DeHaven v. Hoskins,3 °1 summary judgment granted in
favor of one defendant in a negligence action was immediately
appealable because the plaintiff had the right to have determined
by a single jury whether she was injured by the acts of one, both,
or neither of the defendants.3 °2 In Thrift v. Food Lion, Inc.,30 3 the
plaintiff brought an action against Food Lion and Triangle Ice
alleging joint and concurrent negligence which proximately
caused her injuries in a slip and fall.30 4 Food Lion cross-claimed
against Triangle Ice. 30 5 Summary judgment was granted as to
Triangle Ice, and both Food Lion and the plaintiff appealed.30 6
Because the plaintiff's allegations of negligence against both the
defendants arose from the same set of circumstances, the court of
appeals held that the plaintiff had a substantial right to have the
liability of both the defendants decided by the same jury.307 In
addition, both the defendants alleged contributory negligence as a
defense, providing a second issue which could have resulted in
inconsistent verdicts if not heard by the same jury.308
The tenants of an apartment building brought suit against
several parties, individual and corporate, for breach of implied
warranty of habitability, the covenant of quiet enjoyment, unfair
and deceptive trade practices, unfair debt collection, trespass, etc.,
in Baker v. Rushing.30 9 The court of appeals held that because the
claims against all the defendants stemmed from the same allega-
tions of fact, the plaintiffs had a substantial right to have the lia-
bility of all the defendants determined by the same jury.310
b. As to Claims
In determining whether a substantial right was affected by a
partial summary judgment as to fewer than all the claims in a
single action, two lines of cases have developed. In Oestreicher v.
American National Stores, Inc.,311 and its progeny, it was deter-
301. 95 N.C. App. 397, 382 S.E.2d 856, discretionary review denied, 325 N.C.
705, 388 S.E.2d 452 (1989).
302. Id. at 399, 382 S.E.2d at 858.
303. 111 N.C. App. 758, 433 S.E.2d 481 (1993).
304. Id. at 760, 433 S.E.2d at 483.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 761, 433 S.E.2d at 483-84.
308. Id. at 761, 433 S.E.2d at 484.
309. 104 N.C. App. 240, 409 S.E.2d 108 (1991).
310. Id. at 245-46, 409 S.E.2d at 111.
311. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
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mined that regardless of the nature of the issues involved, a plain-
tiff had a substantial right to have all his causes against the same
defendant(s) tried at the same time by the same judge and jury.3 12
The North Carolina Supreme Court later interpreted sections 1-
277 and 7A-27(d)(1) of the General Statutes of North Carolina to
require that the affected party's ability to enforce the substantial
right absent immediate appeal must be lost before the doctrine
could be applied.31 3 In Green v. Duke Power Co., 3 1 4 ,the supreme
court held that generally the right to avoid a trial is not a substan-
tial right, but avoiding two trials on the same issues may be.3 15
The court then created what appears to be a two-part test by stat-
ing that "the possibility of undergoing a second trial affects a sub-
stantial right only when the same issues are present in both
trials, creating the possibility that a party will be prejudiced by
different juries in separate trials rendering inconsistent verdicts
on the same factual issues."316
The cases which rely on Oestreicher have found substantial
rights to be affected merely on the grounds of a party's right to
have all claims or causes determined in one proceeding. Subse-
quent cases relying on Green require the appellant to demonstrate
the possibility of inconsistent verdicts resulting from separate tri-
als on the same factual issues. These discrepancies were
addressed by the court of appeals in detail in J & B Slurry Seal
Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, InC. 3 1 7 In Slurry, while not expressly
overruling the Oestreicher line of cases, the court of appeals indi-
cated its support for the Green line of cases requiring a showing
that separate trials would result in the possibility of inconsistent
verdicts, thereby prejudicing the substantial right in question, in
order to warrant application of the substantial right exception.311
312. Id. at 130, 225 S.E.2d at 805. See also Nasco Equip. Co. v. Mason, 291
N.C. 145,229 S.E.2d 278 (1976); Narron v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 75 N.C. App.
579, 331 S.E.2d 205, discretionary review denied, 314 N.C. 542, 335 S.E.2d 316
(1985).
313. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 207, 240 S.E.2d 338,
343 (1978).
314. 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982).
315. Id. at 606, 290 S.E.2d at 595.
316. Id. at 608, 290 S.E.2d at 596.
317. 88 N.C. App. 1, 362 S.E.2d 812 (1987).
318. Id. at 9, 362 S.E.2d at 817.
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An examination of the cases decided after Slurry tends to show
that this is the current path most often followed. 19
In several recent cases, a substantial right has been found
based on a party's right to have all claims heard by the same judge
and jury.320 In so holding, these cases do not specifically require
a showing of possible inconsistent verdicts, and seem to rely on
the more general requirements of the Oestreicher line of cases. An
examination of ,the facts of these cases, however, indicates that
there exists in each a clear commonality of issues between the
319. See Davidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, 93 N.C. App. 20, 376 S.E.2d 488,
discretonary review denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 772 (1989) (discussion of
Slurry and the right to avoid two trials on overlapping issues), and following
cases: Taylor v. Brinkman, 108 N.C. App. 767, 425 S.E.2d 429, discretionary
review denied, 333 N.C. 795, 431 S.E.2d 30 (1993) (The plaintiff alleged
negligence against the driver of an automobile, and imputed negligence against
the owner of the car the defendant was driving. Summary judgment was granted
as to the claim against the driver. As the remaining claim against the owner of
the car relied on a showing of the negligence of the driver, the possibility of
inconsistent verdicts upon a successful appeal of the summary judgment order
arose.); Lamb v. Lamb, 92 N.C. App. 680, 375 S.E.2d 685 (1989) (Because factual
issues central to the plaintiff's claim were also central to one of the defendant's
dismissed counterclaims, the possibility of inconsistent verdicts arose, affecting a
substantial right of the defendant.); Vaughan v. Moore, 89 N.C. App. 566, 366
S.E.2d 518 (1988) (Personal injury action where two of the plaintiff's three
claims were decided by summary judgment in favor of the defendant; held that
the plaintiff had a substantial right to have all of her damage claims arising out
of the same accident tried before the same trier of fact.); Whitehurst v. Corey, 88
N.C. App. 746, 364 S.E.2d 728 (1988) (A summary judgment on the plaintiff's
claims left the defendants' counterclaims to be decided. As the counterclaims
were grounded in the same legal issues raised by the plaintiff in the complaint,
the defendants had a substantial right to avoid separate trials of the same
issues.).
320. Watson Elec. Constr. Co. v. City of Winston Salem, 109 N.C. App. 194, 426
S.E.2d 420, discretionary review denied, 334 N.C. 167, 432 S.E.2d 369 (1993)
(Plaintiff sued the city and a contractor for breach of contract. The contractor
cross-claimed against the city for indemnification. Summary judgment was
granted in favor of city as to all claims. All claims and cross-claims arose out of
the same contractual obligations, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent
verdicts.); Bowlin v. Duke University, 108 N.C. App. 145, 423 S.E.2d 320 (1992),
discretionary review denied, 333 N.C. 461, 427 S.E.2d 618 (1993) (Multiple
claims grounded in medical malpractice were dismissed as to all the defendants
leaving only the claims of ordinary negligence. All the claims arose out of the
same factual occurrences.); You- v. Roe, 97 N.C. App. 1, 387 S.E.2d 188 (1990)
(Summary judgment was granted for all the defendants from all the claims of the
plaintiff except for three claims remaining against one defendant. All the claims
arose out of the plaintiff's discharge and subsequent involuntary commitment,
thereby relying on the same factual occurrences.).
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claims dismissed and those remaining for trial. Therefore, despite
the reliance on the generalities of the language used in Oes-
treicher, these recent cases are not in conflict with the more strin-
gent requirements of Green and its line of cases.
The issue of what is required to qualify for immediate appel-
late review in these cases may have finally been put to rest in
Moose v. Nissan of Statesville, Inc.s21 In Moose, the court of
appeals firmly established the requirements contained in Green as
controlling.3 22 In order to establish the abridgement of a substan-
tial right, it is necessary to demonstrate the possibility of inconsis-
tent verdicts resulting from separate trials on the same factual
issues.3 23 Applying this holding to Oestreicher, the court of
appeals determined that in cases where partial summary judg-
ment has been granted denying a claim for punitive damages, no
substantial right is affected, as there is no possibility of inconsis-
tent verdicts in such instances.3 24
5. Miscellaneous
In K & K Development Corp. v. Columbia Banking Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n,s25 the court of appeals held that an order of
summary judgment which also awarded attorney's fees affected a
substantial right and was immediately appealable.3 26
321. 115 N.C. App. 423, 444 S.E.2d 694 (1994).
322. Id. at 427, 444 S.E.2d at 697.
323. Id.
324. Id. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text. It should be noted
that Moose was filed within a week prior to the distribution of this paper, and it
may well be brought before the supreme court on discretionary review. For that
reason, take special care before citing this holding. Further, because until that
review is had or denied, appeals involving summary judgment of punitive
damages claims may still be held to affect a substantial right, the following cases
citing Oestreicher, etc. are included herein: Butt v. Goforth Properties, Inc., 95
N.C. App. 615, 383 S.E.2d 387 (1989) (Trial court dismissing the punitive
damages claim, leaving the underlying liability issue. Both claims relied on the
same factual occurrences.); Nance v. Robertson, 91 N.C. App. 121, 370 S.E.2d
283, discretionary review denied, 323 N.C. 477, 373 S.E.2d 865 (1988) (A claim
for punitive damages dismissed by an order of summary judgment affected a
substantial right since the punitive claim and the remaining liability claim
depended on the same evidence. The plaintiffs had a substantial right to try both
claims before the same jury and to avoid the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.).
325. 96 N.C. App. 474, 386 S.E.2d 226 (1989).
326. Id. at 477, 386 S.E.2d at 228. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying
text.
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X. Venue
The right to venue is established by statute and constitutes a
substantial right.3 2 7 The decision of the trial court is immediately
appealable whether the motion asserting a statutory right to
venue is granted or denied.3 28 However, the denial of a motion for
a change of venue for the convenience of witnesses and the ends of
justice is discretionary with the trial court and does not affect a
substantial right of the parties. 29
III. CONCLUSION
As is readily apparent in most of the above sections, there is
little to be gained by an attempt to divine the directions a substan-
tial right analysis will take. The application of such a general rule
to so many specific areas of the law, each with their own unique
procedural requirements, clearly leaves any uniform process of
review beyond our reach. As a result, there seems to be no better
method than the case by case review which is currently in use.
Periodic review of the ever increasing accumulation of case law on
the subject, therefore, appears necessary to provide whatever con-
tinuity in the application of the substantial right doctrine may be
available and maintained. It is hoped that this paper has assisted
in that endeavor.
327. Snow v. Yates, 99 N.C. App. 317, 392 S.E.2d 767 (1990).
328. Id. at 319, 392 S.E.2d at 768. See also Neil Realty Co. v. Medical Care,
Inc., 110 N.C. App. 776, 431 S.E.2d 225 (1993).
329. Furches v. Moore, 48 N.C. App. 430, 430, 269 S.E.2d 635, 635-36 (1980).
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